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Summary
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has many responsibilities for
ensuring the continuity of the “real” economy: production, distribution, and
consumption of public and private goods and services  Other agencies, however, have
long had similar responsibilities for the “financial” sectors of the economy, which
interact with  the sectors DHS oversees pursuant to P.L. 107-296.  DHS has some
responsibilities for financial sectors through Treasury Department links.  Financial
agencies carry out  recovery and security activities independently but also
coordinately with DHS.  For additional information on homeland security, please
consult the CRS current legislative issue “Homeland Security,” on congressional web
site  [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/is-homelandsecurity.shtml].
This report outlines the existing recovery modes to mitigate disasters in
financial markets that events have tested in recent experience, and recovery
arrangements. (Such disasters for the financial economy are of two kinds: inability
to conduct transactions, and large losses of asset value.)  Homeland security requires
the financial institutions that  are important in supporting and maintaining both
domestic and international commerce to take steps to safeguard their ability to carry
out basic functions.  The backbone of the financial economy — the payment system
—  comes through banks, and monetary policy affects them immediately.  Other
crucial intermediation functions come through a variety of financial companies,
including brokers, exchanges, other secondary market facilities, and insurance
companies.  So, many financial regulators and trade associations need to be involved.
Regulators, especially the Federal Reserve, have set out best practice guidelines.
The steps include business information technology protocols, physical security
protocols, and plans for continuity of markets and participants considered critical for
the nation’s transactions.  An Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the
Resilience of the U.S. Financial System, as a new regulation, will likely have positive
consequences for the survivability of financial businesses. Controversies have arisen,
e.g., some insurers believe that federal regulators have no authority to require them
to take such steps, and some in New York are concerned that the area will lose jobs
as facilities become necessarily dispersed.  Costs of application remain of concern.
The 107th Congress enacted legislation strengthening security for and of
financial institutions and markets. Congressional interest in arrangements for
safeguarding  financial sectors. In the 108th Congress, H.R. 657, as passed by the
House, would strengthen the Securities and Exchange Commission’s role in recovery
and continuity of securities and related businesses.  H.R. 2043 would address bank
risks under terrorism, among other things.  Hearings also examined financial security.
Members may want to address financial sector arrangements in light of General
Accounting Office concerns presented at the hearings.  Should a financial emergency
be larger than in  the blackout of August 2003, further oversight would be likely.
This report will be updated as developments warrant.
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Homeland Security: Banking and Financial
Infrastructure Continuity 
Banking and Financial Institutions are Critical
Infrastructure
Financial institutions, not only banks and other depositories, but also securities
dealers, insurers, and investment companies, are collectively a critical infrastructure
element for the U.S. economy.1  They are essential to the minimum operations of the
economy and government.2  Long before 9/11/01, analysts identified financial sector
system vulnerabilities as elements of national economic security in the work of the
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996 and 1997.3 
Financial institutions operate as intermediaries — accepting funds from various
sources and making them available as loans or other investments to those who need
them.  The test of their collective operational effectiveness is how efficiently the
financial system as a whole allocates resources among suppliers and users of funds
to produce real goods and services.  America has grown far beyond a bank-centered
financial economy: financial value has largely become resident on computers as data
rather than physical means of payment.  This element of the financial system is an
area of particular vulnerability.
Financial institutions face two categories of emergencies that could impair their
functioning.  The first is directly financial: danger of a sudden drop in the value of
financial assets, whether originating domestically or elsewhere in the world, such that
a global financial crisis might follow.  The second is operational: failure of physical
support structures that underlie the financial system.  Either could disrupt the nation’s
ability to supply goods and services and alter the behavior of individuals in fear of
the disruption (or fear of greater disruption).  They could reduce the pace of
economic activity, or at an extreme, cause an actual contraction of economic activity.
Financial regulators generally address the former set of problems through
deposit insurance and other sources of liquidity to distressed institutions, safety and
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soundness regulation, and direct intervention.  They address the latter, operational,
set through remediation (as with the Y2K problem), redundancy, and other physical
security.  Under the worst case scenarios, the Federal Reserve (Fed) can relieve the
economic effects of either set by acting as lender of last resort to supply liquidity to
the financial system, employing monetary policy to expand domestic demand (as it
did following the 9/11 terrorist attacks). In the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA), Congress expanded the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort to the
financial and real economies.4  Congress may also legislate direct  federal assistance
to protect the financial infrastructure. It has done so to prevent troubled entities such
as Chrysler, the Farm Credit System, and New York City from defaulting, thus
harming their lenders, and potentially causing failure in major parts of the financial
system and the economy.5  Collapse of one prominent entity could evoke a contagion
effect, in which sound financial institutions become viewed as weak — today’s
equivalent of a bank run, in which panicked customers withdraw funds from many
entities, probably causing others to fail as well.
The Role of DHS
The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002,6 has jurisdiction over functions previously assigned to 22
agencies with respect to certain kinds of communications, transportation, and
computer (“cyber”) security.   These are essential parts of the physical infrastructure
upon which the financial system, like nonfinancial organizations, relies as a user.
They are also parts of the electronic infrastructure of information storage, retrieval,
and transmission. The heart of financial services is information that providers
transform into useful forms, such as account balances at banks, securities price
quotations, executions of purchase and sales of financial assets, and payments on
contractual obligations such as loans.  
Although networks of communication are vital to their work,  financial services
companies do not generally maintain communications and transportation networks,
nor design software or manufacture hardware and carriage devices such as airplanes
and trucks.  Security of communication thus resides with sectors covered by DHS.7
Financial institutions and their regulators operate in a different environment than
nonfinancial ones: they have been developing appropriate (sometimes different)
security protocols within existing  frameworks.  As noted below, however, DHS
interacts with Treasury Department bodies concerned with financial security. The
need for combined cybersecurity for data and physical operations of financial
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businesses,  interconnected via the Internet and otherwise, has recently received  the
attention of the federal Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.8  
Safety Net Measures in Place
Financial Risks
Financial regulation includes deposit insurers, safety and soundness regulators
throughout the financial sectors, and the Fed as lender of last resort and ultimate
protector of the financial system.  The Fed has long stood ready to provide liquidity
to the banking system.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) protects
depositors against failure of a bank or savings association.  In the process, it helps
guard against depositor panics that could drain banks of their funds and create a
severe liquidity crisis as they curtail lending, or call in loans to meet deposit
withdrawals.  Even a healthy depository institution, otherwise untouched by any
cause of failure, would not long withstand a depositor panic.   The FDIC brings order
to the process of resolving such a financial failure.  This agency has long had
authority to prevent the failure of a bank it deems essential, which Congress
supplemented in the 1980s and 1990s to allow even greater flexibility.  The FDIC
may borrow up to $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury, if needed for rescue operations.
Credit unions have similar arrangements with their Central Liquidity Facility and
Share Insurance Fund.  
Although the securities industry lacks a pool of emergency liquidity, securities
firms may also borrow from the Fed if it allows them.  Government protects
individual securities accounts against operational losses — although not collapses of
market value — through the federally-sponsored Securities Investor Protection
Corporation.  All states have guaranty funds to make good the obligations of their
state-regulated insurance companies in case of insolvencies, although, again,  no pool
of liquidity exists for most of this industry nationally. TRIA provides a federal
backstop for insurers willing to provide terrorism insurance.9  Congress intended this
law to assure that such insurance remains available, while protecting providers
against catastrophic payouts in case of terrorist attacks.  This Act has just taken effect
in the marketplace for insurance, although potentially insured parties do not seem to
want to take advantage of it because of high rates. 
Other agencies bolster the national financial safety net by seeking to maintain
confidence in other ways.  A multiplicity of entities and processes are part of the
ongoing safety net, although they do not necessarily assure liquidity or rescue of a
financial failure.  For many years, the securities industry and securities issuers have
had overseers and programs designed to prevent against collapse of confidence
originating within the system.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
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directly and through industry-based self-regulatory organizations such as stock
exchanges, and accountancy standards, has sought  transparency (“disclosure”) in
financial practices, and trading in public securities, of  businesses.  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200210 sought further to restore investor confidence by strengthening
accountability for Corporate America.  Both the Federal Housing Finance Board and
the Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) regulate safety and
transparency of important non-depository housing finance institutions.  The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) oversees organized markets on
futures and similar contracts, through self-regulatory organizations. 
Every state has one or more regulatory bodies responsible for state-chartered
banks, credit unions,  thrift institutions, and companies engaged in securities and
futures operations. Although state-chartered depository institutions are subject to
much federal regulation, the states alone primarily regulate insurance companies,
finance companies, mortgage bankers, and the like.  All 50 states oversee industry-
funded guaranty funds to cover insolvencies in insurance companies, and some
sponsor insurance for credit unions.  Regulatory bodies for their respective industries
are: Conference of State Bank Supervisors, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, and North American Securities Administrators Association. 
Most important for the worst cases of financial disruption, the Fed can inject
funds into the economy to maintain liquidity in the financial system.   Its authority
to lend to individual institutions allows it to support institutions that analysts
characterize as “too-big-to-fail,” because their collapse would pose a systemic risk
to the  economy.  The Fed  has statutory authority to lend to businesses directly in
“unusual or exigent circumstances,” which Congress strengthened in TRIA. 
Operational/Security Risks    
Safety and soundness regulators set guidelines and issue specific regulations for
redundancy and security in physical systems and financial systems.  They have long
required banking institutions to consider operating (security) risks in contingency
planning, and most now include risk of catastrophic disruptions such as occurred on
9/11.  The securities industry is refining its protocols along similar lines.  Insurance
and other nondepository, non-securities financial businesses have not yet revealed so
much planning for continuity this way. Although vital to the economy, they are not
considered as critical: few would  regard inability to process car loans, for example,
as the root problem that failure to process checks and securities would be. 
Safety and Continuity in Recent Experience
Last Decades of 1900s.  Sudden drops in the value of financial assets have
affected the U.S. financial system late in the 20th century, including the stock
market’s crash in 1987, the savings and loan/banking collapse of 1989-1991, the Gulf
War shock of 1991, and  the Asian/Russian  financial crises of 1997-1998. The Fed
and other financial regulators took positive steps to alleviate the resulting difficulties,
providing liquidity to the banking system, and therefore to the economy. They then
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planned steps that in hindsight might have cushioned against experienced  collapses
of value.  Following the stock market plunge in 1987, the President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets11 issued  recommendations, many of which became practice.
That group resurfaced after the late-1990s international disturbances that threatened
the U.S. through just one investment fund: Long Term Capital Management.  It
examined problems that certain derivatives posed to the economy in 1999.  Congress
passed  reforms of  federal deposit insurance and banking regulators’ authorities over
practices threatening depository institutions generally in 1989 and 1991.12  Agency
powers of persuasion, and the Fed’s ability to lend to distressed entities for short-
term liquidity, reinforce formal regulations requiring time not available during crises.
Y2K Threat.  More recently, the operational safety net, particularly that created
to defend against computer problems feared for the year 2000, worked.  The widely
anticipated Y2K “millennium bug” was a software programming problem that could
have caused failures in the infrastructure upon which the system relies.  Public and
private groups spent much effort to prevent widely-feared collapse of financial
capabilities on January 1, 2000; they succeeded.  Y2K came and went without serious
incident in 2000, but the systematic backups and safeguards provided against it
proved invaluable when the unthinkable happened the next year.  
2001.  With the September 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center, both
problems — financial loss of asset values, and operational interruption — occurred
simultaneously.  The financial side of the response worked well, as the Fed provided
the necessary liquidity to prevent panic.  It injected an initial $80  billion, then more,
into the  banking system in a short time.  It arranged international facilities to keep
financial economies operating globally.  The Fed and other central banks cut interest
rates  worldwide, to ease pressures on borrowers. Its total U.S. stimulus may have
exceeded $300 billion.13
The SEC issued emergency rules encouraging buying in the stock market once
it reopened. Trading recommenced rapidly, as the U.S. Treasury security market
opened on September 13, and the equities market was in full operation by September
17.  Physical infrastructure recoveries took a few days of heroic efforts (e.g., running
new connections into Manhattan).  Off-site record keeping, sharing of working space
with displaced competitors, and increasing reliance on electronic tracing and
communications systems by institutions outside the attack area, allowed for
resumption of near-normal operations quickly.  Nonetheless, regulators and industry
groups made it known that financial firms would need new contingency plans and
stress tests to protect against more extreme situations in the future.  Many insurance
companies ceased protecting against  terrorist-related claims or raised premiums for
such coverage sharply.   Operators of high-profile commercial properties now often
CRS-6
14 P.L. 107-042, September 22, 2001. 
15 “Measures Prompted by Sept. 11 Helped Banks Weather Electrical Outage, Snow Says,”
BNA’s Banking Report, August 25, 2003, p.254; Todd Davenport, “In Brief: Outage Sparked
$785M of Fed Lending,” American Banker Online, Aug.  22, 2003; and, Rob Blackwell,
“Backup Site Questions, Utility Loan Prospects,” Ibid.,  August 18, 2003. 
16  Blackwell, Ibid.
go without terrorism indemnity, since high prices still accompany federally-supported
coverage, as noted above.  The government also provides insurance to domestic
airlines under the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.14
Blackout of 2003.  Emergency response measures noted above helped reduce
the financial market damages from a massive Aug. 14 power blackout in the
northeastern United States and Canada.  The Treasury Department received no
reports of major disruptions or losses of financial data, in large part because of steps
taken to make systems  resilient and redundant.  Despite glitches, the major markets,
in stocks, options, commodities, futures, and bonds, were soon open.  Banks closed
affected offices, in New York and Detroit; otherwise, the banking system
overwhelmingly stayed open.  The Fed’s payments and emergency lending to banks
systems operated well.  Banks borrowed $785 million from the Fed after the
blackout, the most since $11.7 billion of the week after Sept. 11, 2001, and have
since repaid most of these amounts.  New applications for mortgages did fall
temporarily because of the blackout.  Contrary to initial fears, terrorists had not
caused the blackout as part of a multifaceted attack, and thus it did not severely stress
the financial economy.15
An unexpected effect of the blackout could aid certain financial businesses,
however.  Lenders to utilities, and underwriters of utility securities, including for
governmental electrical facilities using “municipal bonds,” could well pick up large
financings needed to upgrade electrical infrastructures.16
Financial Business Continuity Proposals
Although the payments system continued to function after the attack on New
York’s financial activity, many firms are still reacting. Many have come to realize
that making their “primary site” coordinated with a “backup site” is not enough.
Hardware and software differences between sites need to be resolved, for example.
The banking sector has made the best recovery: it now functions normally and, with
increasing concerns over safety, has seen inflows of deposits and high profits — even
while lending has experienced problems.  Bond markets had recovered their trading
levels, despite destruction of a company responsible for much of the market for
government bonds.  Bond prices, mirroring the downward movement in interest rates,
are generally higher than in 2001 but are experiencing fears over their quality.  The
stock markets have recovered to a large degree.  With the federal backstop for
insurers, coverage of acts of terrorism has become available.  Nonetheless, financial
sectors remain troubled.  Thus, recovery and continuity have come to the forefront
of many financial planning agendas, including governmental modes noted below.  
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Congressional  
Legislation.   The 107th Congress passed legislation to backstop terrorism
insurance for property-casualty insurers and airlines.  Application of such aid
continues.  Other congressional measures, including tax relief for investors and
financial integrity initiatives, seemingly increased confidence in the securities
markets by 2003.   The House approved  a bill to give the SEC additional authority
in case of a national emergency, on Feb. 26, 2003.  This Emergency Securities
Response Act, H.R. 657, introduced by Representative Garrett, would allow the SEC
to extend emergency orders beyond the ten business days currently allowed. It also
would expand the agency’s ability to grant exemptions from federal securities laws.
Emergency powers could extend for any period specified by the Commission up to
90 calendar days. The House approved a similar bill in 2001, which the Senate did
not consider.  The Senate has not taken up this year’s measure either.  
Oversight and GAO. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has reviewed
threat mitigation  in  financial markets.  GAO has recently released two studies of
continuity plans, physical security, and electronic security for exchanges, electronic
communications networks, market support organizations,  broker-dealers,  banks, etc.
In the first, GAO recommended that the Treasury Department coordinate with
the banking and finance industry in updating the sector’s National Strategy for
Critical Infrastructure Assurance and to fix interim objectives, detailed tasks, time
frames, and responsibilities for the strategy and a process for monitoring its progress.
To help these objectives, GAO suggested Treasury assess the need for grants, tax
incentives, regulation, or other public policy tools.17  GAO also found deficiencies
in the key Treasury/Federal Reserve internet payments system known as “pay.gov,”
which seem to have been fixed.18
Congress examined the agency’s second set of findings19 in a House Financial
Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises hearing held Feb. 12, 2003.20  GAO found that the Fed; the regulator of
national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and SEC lack
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(continued...)
a strategy for having their regulatees resuming trading in securities following any
future disruption of the financial market, and should work with industry to develop
a plan.  GAO’s most direct recommendation for actions were primarily for the SEC’s
operations risk oversight.  For bank regulation, GAO noted that examiners review
physical security, but do not generally focus on terrorism mitigation. 
Regulatory 
Government Securities Clearing. Regulators are concerned about the U.S.
government securities market, in view of its critical role for conducting monetary
policy operations, financing government activities, and providing benchmark prices
and hedging opportunities for other securities markets.  On May 13, 2002, the Fed,
the OCC,  and the SEC issued a White Paper on Structural Change in the Settlement
of Government Securities. That White Paper expressed concerns about operational,
financial, and structural vulnerabilities associated with having only two clearing
banks for settling trades and financing positions.  In response, the Fed has created a
working group to recommend steps to mitigate risks in the clearance and settlement
of U.S. government securities.  It will explore ways the two major clearing banks
could substitute for each other if a calamity would interrupt the services of either.21
Communications.  At the intersection of financial and communications
markets, the Fed (in coordination with Treasury and the other banking agencies) has
strengthened its programs for giving financial businesses emergency preparedness
access to priority communications.22  These programs, which the National
Communications System administers, help the operation and liquidity of banks and
financial markets facing substantial operational disruptions. They are: (1)
Telecommunications Service Priority for circuits used in large-value interbank funds
transfer, securities bidding and transfer, and payment-related services; (2)
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service for priority processing of calls
over terrestrial public switched networks; and (3) Wireless Priority Service of cellular
calls during severe network congestion.
Interagency Paper on Sound Practices.  The Fed, the OCC, and the SEC
have issued an “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience
of the U.S. Financial System.”23  This final regulation24 builds upon a draft  from the




26 Rob Blackwell, “Regulators Put Examiner Update Online,” American Banker Online, Jan.
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clearing and settlement activities of a few financial institutions, provides some
flexibility to firms in managing geographic dispersion of backup facilities and
staffing arrangements, and takes into account cost-effective application of sound
practices.  It includes participation from the New York State Banking Department
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The Interagency Paper analyzes concerns of systemic risk: a breakdown in a
transfer system or a financial market that cannot fulfill its obligations, creating
liquidity and credit problems for customers.  It focuses on protections for “core”
check clearing and settlement and for financial companies involved in “critical
markets,” such as federal funds, foreign exchange, commercial paper, and
government, corporate, and mortgage-backed securities. This regulation deals with
substantial interruptions of transportation, telecommunications, or power systems
throughout a major region, perhaps with evacuation of population.  It sets forth four
broad sound practices that a covered firm should carry out:
! Identify clearing and settlement activities supporting critical
financial          markets;
! Determine appropriate recovery and resumption objectives for
clearing and      settlement activities in support of critical markets;
! Maintain sufficiently geographically dispersed resources to meet
recovery and  resumption activities, and;
! Routinely use or test recovery and resumption arrangements.
This paper suggests that practices for recovery and continuity include “robust”
backup facilities for clearance and settlement activities, resumption of normal
business within two hours, regular testing of  backup facilities, and backup personnel.
Issuing agencies stressed that it will take several years to carry out recommended
sound practices fully. They did not recommend moving primary offices of financial
and securities firms, contrary to some expectations. 
The Interagency  Paper does not cover most of the world of finance, however.
It does not address retail or trading operations, nor the insurance sector. Since it only
covers the largest entities of a  wholesale nature, no other regulators issued it.
  
FFIEC.   The four bank and single credit union regulatory agencies, however,
meet together as the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.  This
Council’s information technology subcommittee serves as a vehicle for coordinating
agency policies on technological and related risks now including security protocols
and financial business continuity.26  It is coming to have a larger role in physical- and
cyber-security financial protocols. 
Basel II.  For the largest U.S. commercial banking organizations, the Fed has
proposed additional mandates in its planned regulation known as the”Basel II Capital
Accord.” Among the issues raised by Basel II is its controversial operational risk
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requirement for covered firms to carry greater capital.  Operational risk refers to
noncredit risk factors including system failures and terrorism, such as 9/11.  Hearings
by two subcommittees of the House Financial Services Committee in 2003 explored
some of its implications, which most bankers feel are burdensome.27  The 108th
Congress measure, United States Financial Policy Committee for Fair Capital
Standards Act,  H.R. 2043, would address perceived needs to improve Basel II,
including its operational risk component.
Fed Rescue Plan. In the broader picture, the Fed is reportedly planning to
lend massively to banks and other entities to ensure that financial markets do not lock
up, should another major shock occur against the financial system.  It may attempt
such a rescue plan for the economy — even without another 9/11 emergency.28
Executive 
Government’s Own Financing.  Congress generally requires financial
bodies within government itself to develop, document, and carry out agency-wide
information security programs under the E-Government Act of 2002.29   The Treasury
Department and other federal bodies have taken steps to protect the government’s
critical financial functions including  to:  borrow;   make payments including social
security; and  raise revenue through the Internal Revenue Service.  Should the threat
level rise, agencies will (1) increase physical and cyber-security measures including
security forces, the frequency of security patrols,  identity checks, and restricting
access with state and local authorities to enhance physical security for specific
assets; (2)  disperse individuals critical to operations; and (3) use backup facilities.30
Infrastructure Board, Council and Office.  President Bush has appointed
executives of the banking and securities industries to the National Infrastructure
Advisory Council (Council).  The members of this panel advise the White House on
cyber- and information-security of critical economic infrastructures, including
financial ones.  It builds upon, in part, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
(CIAO) created in 1998 to coordinate federal initiatives on critical infrastructures.
CIAO’s areas of focus cut across industry sectors to seek a cohesive approach to
continuity in critical infrastructures.  CIAO has a large role in the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board (Board).  The President appointed the Director of
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CIAO as Director of the Board and to serve on its Coordination Committee: thus
CIAO is involved with financial security.  CIAO also supports the Council.31
FBIIC.  Treasury’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, formed after 9/11
under Treasury’s Office of Financial Institutions, staffs the Financial and Banking
Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC).  Its chair is the Treasury’s Assistant
Secretary for Financial Institutions.  FBIIC is a standing committee of the Board,
noted above, assuming a sectoral role for DHS.32  Its mission involves coordinating
federal and state efforts to improve the reliability and security of the U.S. financial
system.33  FBIIC, created by Executive Order in 2001,  includes representatives of:
! Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
! Conference of State Bank Supervisors
! Department of the Treasury 
! Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
! Federal Housing Finance Board
! Federal Reserve Bank of New York
! Federal Reserve Board
! Homeland Security Council
! National Association of Insurance Commissioners
! National Credit Union Administration
! Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
! Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
! Office of Thrift Supervision
! Securities and Exchange Commission.
In fulfilling its mission, FBIIC is to: (1) identify critical infrastructure assets,
their locations, potential vulnerabilities, and rank their importance to the financial
system of the United States; (2) secure communications capability between the
financial regulators and protocols for communicating during an emergency; and (3)
ensure sufficient staff at each member agency with appropriate security clearances
to handle classified information and  coordinate in case of an emergency.  FBIIC will
conduct vulnerability assessments of the retail payment system, government-
sponsored enterprises, and the insurance industry — none directly addressed in the
White Paper noted above — and other improvements to financial resiliency.34 
Public/Private Treasury Efforts.  Treasury has created a public/private
partnership to ally with FBIIC,  drawing together industry initiatives and coordinating
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private sector outreach for critical infrastructure protection and homeland security.
Trade associations have ties to these Treasury arrangements through a Financial
Services Sector Coordinating Council for the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
noted below.35  Treasury efforts to reduce vulnerabilities include providing
alternative lines of communication for market participants.  The department has also
offered to provide extra physical security measures, necessarily undisclosed, to key
financial institutions requesting them.36  A more concrete outline of Treasury’s
approach to the problems is its four-pronged overall approach to promoting
continuity in the financial system and preventing interruption in case of a
catastrophe. According to Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Abernathy,
the focus first is on people. The second critical element is maintaining a high level
of confidence in the functioning of the financial system.  The third element is making
sure that markets remain open — or, if they do close, reopen as quickly as possible.
The final element of the plan is that resilience requires diversification if the primary
place of business is nonfunctional.37
OFHEO.  Disaster recovery and back-up protocols mentioned in the
Interagency Paper are seemingly also required by  OFHEO — an independent office
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development — in its safety and
soundness examinations of the government-sponsored housing finance enterprises
it oversees. The latter, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and Federal
National Mortgage Association, are developing resilience internally as well.38
Agency Consolidation?.  The Administration is likely to suggest that some
consolidation of financial regulatory bodies occur via a new statute.  Regulatory
streamlining could  make the financial safety net better: emergency action would
require less coordination.  Standardized, therefore more effective, interindustry
regulation seeking to combat emergencies beforehand could also result.  Legislation
in the 108th Congress seeks to consolidate regulatory oversight over the housing
finance government-sponsored enterprises, away from OFHEO, for example.39
Private Sector
FS-ISAC and Payments Networks.  Y2K and other threats to financial
companies had been feared for years. Many businesses sought to defend their
operations in advance through hardware and software tests and upgrades.  For
example,  they created the  Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis
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Center (FS-ISAC) in 1999.  More than 40 of the nation’s largest banking, securities,
insurance, and investment firms participate in FS-ISAC, maintaining a database of
security threats and system vulnerabilities, which they tie in with Treasury’s bodies
noted above.40  Participants privately run FS-ISAC, like ISACs of all sectors.41
Prominent funds transfer networks have strengthened their continuity plans.42
Securities Industry.  The Securities Industry Association (SIA) has released
best practices guidelines for its members’ recovery from disasters.  SIA is also
working with utility providers in New York to improve physical recovery measures.
The New York Stock Exchange has developed back-up and redundancy facilities,
although events did not damage its own facilities in the terror attacks.  This exchange
and the over-the-counter NASDAQ  have agreed to trade each other’s stocks if either
were to become incapacitated.  The National Association of Securities Dealers may
require business continuity plans of a similar nature.
 
FSSCC. Organizations representing most significant  financial entities have
joined  the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Homeland Security.43  Its members, some of whom have self-
regulatory oversight of their groups, cover most of America’s finance, are the:
! American Bankers Association 
! America’s Community Bankers 
! American Council of Life Insurers
! American Insurance Association 
! American Society for Industrial Security 
! American Stock Exchange LLC/NASD 
! Bank Administration Institute (BAI) 
! BITS and Financial Services Roundtable 
! Consumer Bankers Association 
! Credit Union National Association 
! Fannie Mae
! Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-
ISAC) 
! Futures Industry Association 
! Independent Community Bankers of America 
! Investment Company Institute 
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! Managed Funds Association
! NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. 
! National Association of Federal Credit Unions 
! National Automated Clearinghouse Association 
! New York Clearing House 
! Securities Industry Association
! Securities Industry Automation Corporation 
! The Bond Market Association
! The Options Clearing Corporation.
This body coordinates regularly and voluntarily with FBIIC.
Conclusion: Convergence of Private and Public
Practices for Financial Recovery and Continuity
Many practices in the Interagency Paper came from financial firms’ experiences
and may thus be considered both public and private-sector ideas.  Should the threat
level increase, government expects critical private financial institutions to have
security forces, identity checks, and restricted access, and to work with state and local
authorities.44  The Fed, a body with both public and private elements,45 remains ready
to be the lender of last resort to the financial system and its customers as well. 
Recovery in the blackout of 2003, for example, was facilitated by the Fed,
institutions activating internal contingency plans,  as well as a paging and alert
system set up after Sept. 11 by the Financial Services Roundtable (a group of major
financial providers) and its technology arm, called BITS.46 
 
List of Major Acronyms
CFTC           Commodity Futures Trading Commission
CIAO           Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
DHS             Department of Homeland Security
FBIIC           Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee
FDIC            Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Fed               Federal Reserve System
CRS-15
FS-ISAC      Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
FSSCC         Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical                
             Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security
GAO            General Accounting Office 
OCC             Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OFHEO        Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight
SEC              Securities and Exchange Commission 
TRIA            Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.
